duhamelski
Active member
this is for an 11th grade elective. it is the hardest and most complex paper i have ever written. what do you think:
John Duhamel
US Foreign Policy
Robin Workman
The Change of US Foreign Policy and the
Evolution of World Affairs[/b]
[/b]
Since
the very beginnings of the United States of America, Foreign Policy has been
one of the most contested and debated issues that the government has had to
face. Whether dealing with rivaling
empires on the American continent, deciding how best to intervene in wars
threatening to establish some of the most evil tyrants in history as world
dictators, or determining how best to combat our enemies by finding small
groups of them one by one in cave hideaways, the US foreign policy is always in
need of modifications. John Lewis Gaddis
tried to tackle this subject in his novel Surprise, Security, and the
American Experience. In this novel,
Gaddis discusses US Foreign Policy as it pertains to the themes of Preemption,
Unilateralism, and Hegemony, noting how they have changed as processes of the
world itself have changed. He tackles US
Foreign Policy during the early years of the United States, World War One, World
War Two, the Cold War, and finally the War Against Terrorism. US Foreign Policy has changed tremendously,
without veering too far from any of the three themes stated above. Gaddis distinguishes how each of these four
events has contributed to the evolution of US Foreign Policy.
As
the United States struggled
to establish itself in the World Arena, it received tremendous pressure from
rivaling empires sharing the Americas
with them. Great
Britain still controlled of Canada
and claimed possession of the Oregon Territory, Russia occupied Alaska and the better portion of the west coast, and Spain remained in control of Florida (16). Therefore, the United States was very insecure
about its place as a new country surrounded by empires that were comparatively
much more powerful and established. John
Quincy Adams therefore emphasized the importance of National Security and
drafted what he considered the best way to achieve his aspirations. To Adams,
the most important concerns for the nation were the principles of Preemption,
Unilateralism, and Hegemony. Adams’
logic, as described by Gaddis, stressed that the United States had “vast borders to
defend, but only limited means with which to defend them” (16). Thus, he emphasized the principle of
preemption. For example, when Jackson invaded the Spanish colony of Florida
without proper authorization, it was Adams’ who came to Jackson’s defense. Instead of apologizing to Spain and hoping that no hostility would pursue,
Adams urged the Monroe administration to insist
that the United States
had the right to defend itself from possible threats. This allowed the United States to act in its defense
whenever it deemed it necessary.
The next principle that Adams
emphasized was Unilateralism. Adams decided that it would be a mistake to rely on the
goodwill of other nations for its security.
Therefore, the United
States should be prepared to defend itself
from anyone at any time. Adams wanted to
remain independent from European affairs in order to avoid inclusion in
unimportant wars and to ensure that uninvited foreign wars did not extend to
the United States. Adams had a chance to demonstrate this ethic
after the end of Spanish control of South America. Fearful that enemies such as Russia and France
would help Spain regain
their control, Great Britain
proposed a partnership with the United
States that would prevent any such act from
happening. Despite great interest in the
White House, Adams insisted that it was important for the US not to commit itself to Britain in any
way, and refused to enter into a formal treaty (23-24). Adams’
greatest legacy was the drafting of the first clear and precise US Foreign
Policy.
Finally, Adams
also emphasized the principle of Hegemony.
As the United States
did share the continent of North America with the British, Russians, Spaniards,
and Native Americans, Adams realized the importance of establishing the United States
as the dominant force on the continent in order to coexist with neighboring
colonies. Essentially, Adams deemed that
the United States
could not coexist equally with neighboring powers. Adams reckoned that if the United States
was the dominating force, it would eliminate many of the threats posed by other
powers on the continent. Gaddis states Adams’ genius best: “that the nation’s population,
economy, and potential strength could only grow, while the ability of European
powers could only diminish. There was no
reason, hence, to hide hegemonic aspirations” (27). This remained the US Foreign Policy for the
duration of the 19th century.
Despite
the genius of Adams’ foreign policy, changes
in World Arena politics required certain alterations to be made to the US
Foreign Policy. President Wilson’s decision
to enter WWI as an “associated” power marked the first time that any
considerable change was made to Adams’ foreign
policy (49). One might assume that Wilson chose to ignore Adams’
principle of Unilateralism by meddling in European affairs, and Gaddis admits
that this is partly true. However, one
may also argue that Wilson was not destroying
the US’s Unilateralism, but
instead advocating the US’s
Preemptive nature. Wilson
greatly feared the potential damage to the US
economy if Germany
won the war. Therefore, Wilson
was ultimately defending the United
States from the threat of an indirect attack
to its economy. This may explain Wilson’s decision to
enter the war as an “associated” power instead of an “allied” power. This mere title of the United States position in WWI allowed Wilson to avoid any commitment to Europe
at any point in the future. For this
reason, it could be argued that the Wilson
simply was forced to comprise the existing Foreign Policy without actually
changing it. However, Wilson did propose (unsuccessfully) a change
to the idea of hegemony. Wilson’s idea for the League of
Nations would essentially unify the major world powers with the
intention of maintaining peace . These
nations would work together to prevent wars, protect civil liberties, and
eliminate tyrants. Wilson decided that such an organization
would be necessary as the world became more global. The Senate disagreed and rejected the
proposal (43). However, Wilson’s efforts noted the first time that
anyone made an effort to change the US Foreign Policy.
President
Wilson failed at making any official change to the US Foreign Policy, but
Franklin Roosevelt was not discouraged by Wilson’s
failure. FDR faced one of the most
shocking events of the 20th century: the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. FDR realized then that the United States
was no longer safe under the principle of Unilateralism. Although the United
States remained distant in world affairs at the time, Japan ultimately attacked the United States,
demonstrating the failure of the Unilateralism principle. The United States was therefore forced
to retaliate. In order to go to such a
large scale war, however, the US
needed allies. The United States was forced to ally itself with Britain, and
its hegemony was destroyed. When Hitler
declared war on the United States
four days after the Pearl Harbor bombings (50), the US
became embroiled in the war in Europe and
forced to fight as allied equals with other nations. It is important to notice
that this time the US
entered the war as an “ally” instead of an “associated” power. This change shows how an alteration in how
the world conducted itself forced the United States to completely reverse
its foreign policy. The United States
was now equal with other nations (no longer hegemonic) and forced to rely on
other nations to help protect it, thereby becoming multilateral in its foreign
policy. Roosevelt
was uncompromising with regard to his new foreign policy. His idea of an “arsenal of democracy,” as
Gaddis describes, “intended for the Allies to do most of the fighting”
(50). No single nation would wage any
war by itself, and a team effort was needed to keep damage to a minimum. It is for this change that Roosevelt
is referred to as the most influential strategist of the 20th
century.
With
the end WWII came a new era of warfare.
The Second World War had introduced the global superpowers to the
extremely destructive potential of atomic weaponry, and the superpowers
immediately began creating their arsenals of such weapons. An arms race ensued, encouraging mainly the United States and the Soviet
Union to build massive collections of nuclear weapons. As Gaddis explains, “FDR’s hopes for the Soviet Union [an ally that would work with the other
members of the Grand Alliance] had failed” (59). It was painfully clear that Stalin had no
wishes to engage in a multilateral world and intended to become the sole world
superpower. Hence the Cold War began. However, the one piece of the US foreign
policy that was not indefinitely changed by WWII, preemption, changed. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union remained on the brink of a nuclear war, yet neither side had
the guts to attempt to eliminate the other for fear of the consequences it
would bring with it. Preemption subsequently
became irrelevant to the US
foreign policy, and the main objective of either side became ensuring that
neither side could safely eliminate the other.
Thus, the strategy of containment became a focus of US foreign
policy. The US essentially tried to contain the
Soviets by “figuratively if not literally, building a wall” (59). The United
States tried to extend its cause to the whole world,
which in turn (and in theory) would hold the Soviet Union
to a standstill. Ironically, instead of
using the hard power tactics of hegemony, the US chose to combat the Soviet
hegemony with its soft power tactic of containment. By this point, the original US foreign policy, as drafted by John Quincy
Adams, resembled the complete opposite of what Adams
advocated.
Another
type of warfare has currently emerged, and has caused US Foreign Policy to
continue its soft power tactics and multilateralism, as well as return to the
preemptive roots advocated by John Adams.
Intentionally or not, the United States is the only remaining
world super power, and has thereby become a hegemonic nation. Because of this, the threat of attack from
other nations is almost non-existent. On
the other hand, a new type of threat has emerged. This threat is not as easy to fight as a
nation for many reasons; it can hide, and only represents a tiny population; it
has discovered how to shake a nation.
This threat is referred to as terrorism.
Since the events of September 11th, 2001, terrorism has been
a topic on everyone’s mind. Terrorists
have succeeded in suppressing a nation through fear. No one knows what can be used as a device for
terrorism, and in what form we will see terrorists next. As Gaddis says, “it’s hard to foresee what’s
never been attempted” (74). However,
terrorism has required yet another reworking of the US foreign policy. Because of the impossibility of eliminating
terrorists, the US
can only combat terrorism by preventing attacks before they occur. This, obviously, makes preemption of primary
importance. Any suspicion that an act of
terrorism will occur will cause United
States to intervene. In addition, soft power tactics and
multilateralism are important. It is
important that it is not perceived by the world that the US did not deserve what they got on
9/11. Also, the United States
needs help from foreign countries to gather intelligence and combat terrorists,
especially the countries in which the terrorists have located their bases. It is therefore important to eliminate
leaders who will not cooperate with the United States. Bush’s foreign policy is as follows: “We will
defend peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve peace by building relations
among the great powers. We will
encourage peace by encouraging free and open societies in every continent”
(83). Essentially, the US will defend
peace by eliminating terrorists and the people who protect them, it will build
relations with nations that it needs in order to eliminate terrorists, and it will
remove oppressive environments in which terrorists prevail.
US
foreign policy has changed tremendously from its original form. As Gaddis describes in his book, these
changes are inevitable as world politics evolves. As US history has progressed, its
three basic foreign policy themes of Preemption, Hegemony, and Unilateralism
have all, at some point, been altered to resemble their polar opposites, and in
the case of Preemption and Hegemony, changed back. It is important, however, to realize that
these three themes have been the center of US Foreign Policy for the entirety
of US
history. Inevitably, as the world
changes in the future, so will US Foreign Policy, but it is doubtful that it
will ever center itself around anything other than these three themes or their
opposites.
John Duhamel
US Foreign Policy
Robin Workman
The Change of US Foreign Policy and the
Evolution of World Affairs[/b]
[/b]
Since
the very beginnings of the United States of America, Foreign Policy has been
one of the most contested and debated issues that the government has had to
face. Whether dealing with rivaling
empires on the American continent, deciding how best to intervene in wars
threatening to establish some of the most evil tyrants in history as world
dictators, or determining how best to combat our enemies by finding small
groups of them one by one in cave hideaways, the US foreign policy is always in
need of modifications. John Lewis Gaddis
tried to tackle this subject in his novel Surprise, Security, and the
American Experience. In this novel,
Gaddis discusses US Foreign Policy as it pertains to the themes of Preemption,
Unilateralism, and Hegemony, noting how they have changed as processes of the
world itself have changed. He tackles US
Foreign Policy during the early years of the United States, World War One, World
War Two, the Cold War, and finally the War Against Terrorism. US Foreign Policy has changed tremendously,
without veering too far from any of the three themes stated above. Gaddis distinguishes how each of these four
events has contributed to the evolution of US Foreign Policy.
As
the United States struggled
to establish itself in the World Arena, it received tremendous pressure from
rivaling empires sharing the Americas
with them. Great
Britain still controlled of Canada
and claimed possession of the Oregon Territory, Russia occupied Alaska and the better portion of the west coast, and Spain remained in control of Florida (16). Therefore, the United States was very insecure
about its place as a new country surrounded by empires that were comparatively
much more powerful and established. John
Quincy Adams therefore emphasized the importance of National Security and
drafted what he considered the best way to achieve his aspirations. To Adams,
the most important concerns for the nation were the principles of Preemption,
Unilateralism, and Hegemony. Adams’
logic, as described by Gaddis, stressed that the United States had “vast borders to
defend, but only limited means with which to defend them” (16). Thus, he emphasized the principle of
preemption. For example, when Jackson invaded the Spanish colony of Florida
without proper authorization, it was Adams’ who came to Jackson’s defense. Instead of apologizing to Spain and hoping that no hostility would pursue,
Adams urged the Monroe administration to insist
that the United States
had the right to defend itself from possible threats. This allowed the United States to act in its defense
whenever it deemed it necessary.
The next principle that Adams
emphasized was Unilateralism. Adams decided that it would be a mistake to rely on the
goodwill of other nations for its security.
Therefore, the United
States should be prepared to defend itself
from anyone at any time. Adams wanted to
remain independent from European affairs in order to avoid inclusion in
unimportant wars and to ensure that uninvited foreign wars did not extend to
the United States. Adams had a chance to demonstrate this ethic
after the end of Spanish control of South America. Fearful that enemies such as Russia and France
would help Spain regain
their control, Great Britain
proposed a partnership with the United
States that would prevent any such act from
happening. Despite great interest in the
White House, Adams insisted that it was important for the US not to commit itself to Britain in any
way, and refused to enter into a formal treaty (23-24). Adams’
greatest legacy was the drafting of the first clear and precise US Foreign
Policy.
Finally, Adams
also emphasized the principle of Hegemony.
As the United States
did share the continent of North America with the British, Russians, Spaniards,
and Native Americans, Adams realized the importance of establishing the United States
as the dominant force on the continent in order to coexist with neighboring
colonies. Essentially, Adams deemed that
the United States
could not coexist equally with neighboring powers. Adams reckoned that if the United States
was the dominating force, it would eliminate many of the threats posed by other
powers on the continent. Gaddis states Adams’ genius best: “that the nation’s population,
economy, and potential strength could only grow, while the ability of European
powers could only diminish. There was no
reason, hence, to hide hegemonic aspirations” (27). This remained the US Foreign Policy for the
duration of the 19th century.
Despite
the genius of Adams’ foreign policy, changes
in World Arena politics required certain alterations to be made to the US
Foreign Policy. President Wilson’s decision
to enter WWI as an “associated” power marked the first time that any
considerable change was made to Adams’ foreign
policy (49). One might assume that Wilson chose to ignore Adams’
principle of Unilateralism by meddling in European affairs, and Gaddis admits
that this is partly true. However, one
may also argue that Wilson was not destroying
the US’s Unilateralism, but
instead advocating the US’s
Preemptive nature. Wilson
greatly feared the potential damage to the US
economy if Germany
won the war. Therefore, Wilson
was ultimately defending the United
States from the threat of an indirect attack
to its economy. This may explain Wilson’s decision to
enter the war as an “associated” power instead of an “allied” power. This mere title of the United States position in WWI allowed Wilson to avoid any commitment to Europe
at any point in the future. For this
reason, it could be argued that the Wilson
simply was forced to comprise the existing Foreign Policy without actually
changing it. However, Wilson did propose (unsuccessfully) a change
to the idea of hegemony. Wilson’s idea for the League of
Nations would essentially unify the major world powers with the
intention of maintaining peace . These
nations would work together to prevent wars, protect civil liberties, and
eliminate tyrants. Wilson decided that such an organization
would be necessary as the world became more global. The Senate disagreed and rejected the
proposal (43). However, Wilson’s efforts noted the first time that
anyone made an effort to change the US Foreign Policy.
President
Wilson failed at making any official change to the US Foreign Policy, but
Franklin Roosevelt was not discouraged by Wilson’s
failure. FDR faced one of the most
shocking events of the 20th century: the bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. FDR realized then that the United States
was no longer safe under the principle of Unilateralism. Although the United
States remained distant in world affairs at the time, Japan ultimately attacked the United States,
demonstrating the failure of the Unilateralism principle. The United States was therefore forced
to retaliate. In order to go to such a
large scale war, however, the US
needed allies. The United States was forced to ally itself with Britain, and
its hegemony was destroyed. When Hitler
declared war on the United States
four days after the Pearl Harbor bombings (50), the US
became embroiled in the war in Europe and
forced to fight as allied equals with other nations. It is important to notice
that this time the US
entered the war as an “ally” instead of an “associated” power. This change shows how an alteration in how
the world conducted itself forced the United States to completely reverse
its foreign policy. The United States
was now equal with other nations (no longer hegemonic) and forced to rely on
other nations to help protect it, thereby becoming multilateral in its foreign
policy. Roosevelt
was uncompromising with regard to his new foreign policy. His idea of an “arsenal of democracy,” as
Gaddis describes, “intended for the Allies to do most of the fighting”
(50). No single nation would wage any
war by itself, and a team effort was needed to keep damage to a minimum. It is for this change that Roosevelt
is referred to as the most influential strategist of the 20th
century.
With
the end WWII came a new era of warfare.
The Second World War had introduced the global superpowers to the
extremely destructive potential of atomic weaponry, and the superpowers
immediately began creating their arsenals of such weapons. An arms race ensued, encouraging mainly the United States and the Soviet
Union to build massive collections of nuclear weapons. As Gaddis explains, “FDR’s hopes for the Soviet Union [an ally that would work with the other
members of the Grand Alliance] had failed” (59). It was painfully clear that Stalin had no
wishes to engage in a multilateral world and intended to become the sole world
superpower. Hence the Cold War began. However, the one piece of the US foreign
policy that was not indefinitely changed by WWII, preemption, changed. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet
Union remained on the brink of a nuclear war, yet neither side had
the guts to attempt to eliminate the other for fear of the consequences it
would bring with it. Preemption subsequently
became irrelevant to the US
foreign policy, and the main objective of either side became ensuring that
neither side could safely eliminate the other.
Thus, the strategy of containment became a focus of US foreign
policy. The US essentially tried to contain the
Soviets by “figuratively if not literally, building a wall” (59). The United
States tried to extend its cause to the whole world,
which in turn (and in theory) would hold the Soviet Union
to a standstill. Ironically, instead of
using the hard power tactics of hegemony, the US chose to combat the Soviet
hegemony with its soft power tactic of containment. By this point, the original US foreign policy, as drafted by John Quincy
Adams, resembled the complete opposite of what Adams
advocated.
Another
type of warfare has currently emerged, and has caused US Foreign Policy to
continue its soft power tactics and multilateralism, as well as return to the
preemptive roots advocated by John Adams.
Intentionally or not, the United States is the only remaining
world super power, and has thereby become a hegemonic nation. Because of this, the threat of attack from
other nations is almost non-existent. On
the other hand, a new type of threat has emerged. This threat is not as easy to fight as a
nation for many reasons; it can hide, and only represents a tiny population; it
has discovered how to shake a nation.
This threat is referred to as terrorism.
Since the events of September 11th, 2001, terrorism has been
a topic on everyone’s mind. Terrorists
have succeeded in suppressing a nation through fear. No one knows what can be used as a device for
terrorism, and in what form we will see terrorists next. As Gaddis says, “it’s hard to foresee what’s
never been attempted” (74). However,
terrorism has required yet another reworking of the US foreign policy. Because of the impossibility of eliminating
terrorists, the US
can only combat terrorism by preventing attacks before they occur. This, obviously, makes preemption of primary
importance. Any suspicion that an act of
terrorism will occur will cause United
States to intervene. In addition, soft power tactics and
multilateralism are important. It is
important that it is not perceived by the world that the US did not deserve what they got on
9/11. Also, the United States
needs help from foreign countries to gather intelligence and combat terrorists,
especially the countries in which the terrorists have located their bases. It is therefore important to eliminate
leaders who will not cooperate with the United States. Bush’s foreign policy is as follows: “We will
defend peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve peace by building relations
among the great powers. We will
encourage peace by encouraging free and open societies in every continent”
(83). Essentially, the US will defend
peace by eliminating terrorists and the people who protect them, it will build
relations with nations that it needs in order to eliminate terrorists, and it will
remove oppressive environments in which terrorists prevail.
US
foreign policy has changed tremendously from its original form. As Gaddis describes in his book, these
changes are inevitable as world politics evolves. As US history has progressed, its
three basic foreign policy themes of Preemption, Hegemony, and Unilateralism
have all, at some point, been altered to resemble their polar opposites, and in
the case of Preemption and Hegemony, changed back. It is important, however, to realize that
these three themes have been the center of US Foreign Policy for the entirety
of US
history. Inevitably, as the world
changes in the future, so will US Foreign Policy, but it is doubtful that it
will ever center itself around anything other than these three themes or their
opposites.
