Op-Ed Contributor
My Tortured Decision
By ALI SOUFAN
Published: April 22, 2009
FOR seven years I have remained silent about the false claims
magnifying the effectiveness of the so-called enhanced interrogation
techniques like waterboarding. I have spoken only in closed government
hearings, as these matters were classified. But the release last week
of four Justice Department memos on interrogations allows me to shed
light on the story, and on some of the lessons to be learned.
One of the most striking parts
of the memos is the false premises on which they are based. The first,
dated August 2002, grants authorization to use harsh interrogation
techniques on a high-ranking terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, on the grounds
that previous methods hadn’t been working. The next three memos cite
the successes of those methods as a justification for their continued
use.
It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah had
been uncooperative. Along with another F.B.I. agent, and with several
C.I.A. officers present, I questioned him from March to June 2002,
before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August. Under
traditional interrogation methods, he provided us with important
actionable intelligence.
We discovered, for example, that
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Abu
Zubaydah also told us about Jose Padilla, the so-called dirty bomber.
This experience fit what I had found throughout my counterterrorism
career: traditional interrogation techniques are successful in
identifying operatives, uncovering plots and saving lives.
There was no actionable intelligence gained from using enhanced
interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah that wasn’t, or couldn’t have
been, gained from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using these
alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on more than a few
occasions — all of which are still classified. The short sightedness
behind the use of these techniques ignored the unreliability of the
methods, the nature of the threat, the mentality and modus operandi of
the terrorists, and due process.
Defenders of these techniques
have claimed that they got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading
to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a top aide to Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, and Mr. Padilla. This is false. The information that led to
Mr. Shibh’s capture came primarily from a different terrorist operative
who was interviewed using traditional methods. As for Mr. Padilla, the
dates just don’t add up: the harsh techniques were approved in the memo
of August 2002, Mr. Padilla had been arrested that May.
One of
the worst consequences of the use of these harsh techniques was that it
reintroduced the so-called Chinese wall between the C.I.A. and F.B.I.,
similar to the communications obstacles that prevented us from working
together to stop the 9/11 attacks. Because the bureau would not employ
these problematic techniques, our agents who knew the most about the
terrorists could have no part in the investigation. An F.B.I. colleague
of mine who knew more about Khalid Shaikh Mohammed than anyone in the
government was not allowed to speak to him.
It was the right
decision to release these memos, as we need the truth to come out. This
should not be a partisan matter, because it is in our national security
interest to regain our position as the world’s foremost defenders of
human rights. Just as important, releasing these memos enables us to
begin the tricky process of finally bringing these terrorists to
justice.
The debate after the release of these memos has centered
on whether C.I.A. officials should be prosecuted for their role in
harsh interrogation techniques. That would be a mistake. Almost all the
agency officials I worked with on these issues were good people who
felt as I did about the use of enhanced techniques: it is un-American,
ineffective and harmful to our national security.
Fortunately
for me, after I objected to the enhanced techniques, the message came
through from Pat D’Amuro, an F.B.I. assistant director, that “we don’t
do that,” and I was pulled out of the interrogations by the F.B.I.
director, Robert Mueller (this was documented in the report released last year by the Justice Department’s inspector general).
My C.I.A. colleagues
who balked at the techniques, on the other hand, were instructed to
continue. (It’s worth noting that when reading between the lines of the
newly released memos, it seems clear that it was contractors, not
C.I.A. officers, who requested the use of these techniques.)
As
we move forward, it’s important to not allow the torture issue to harm
the reputation, and thus the effectiveness, of the C.I.A. The agency is
essential to our national security. We must ensure that the mistakes
behind the use of these techniques are never repeated. We’re making a
good start: President Obama has limited interrogation techniques to the
guidelines set in the Army Field Manual, and Leon Panetta, the C.I.A.
director, says he has banned the use of contractors and secret overseas
prisons for terrorism suspects (the so-called black sites). Just as
important, we need to ensure that no new mistakes are made in the
process of moving forward — a real danger right now.
Ali Soufan was an F.B.I. supervisory special agent from 1997 to 2005.
---
So, ignoring that it's just plain torture and wrong, seems they weren't all that effective. Can we all just agree it was very wrong and to never stoop to that low of a level of human rights again, please? I don't understand how anyone can actually think this was in any way OK or try to justify it.
Like this chump...
My Tortured Decision
By ALI SOUFAN
Published: April 22, 2009
FOR seven years I have remained silent about the false claims
magnifying the effectiveness of the so-called enhanced interrogation
techniques like waterboarding. I have spoken only in closed government
hearings, as these matters were classified. But the release last week
of four Justice Department memos on interrogations allows me to shed
light on the story, and on some of the lessons to be learned.
One of the most striking parts
of the memos is the false premises on which they are based. The first,
dated August 2002, grants authorization to use harsh interrogation
techniques on a high-ranking terrorist, Abu Zubaydah, on the grounds
that previous methods hadn’t been working. The next three memos cite
the successes of those methods as a justification for their continued
use.
It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah had
been uncooperative. Along with another F.B.I. agent, and with several
C.I.A. officers present, I questioned him from March to June 2002,
before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August. Under
traditional interrogation methods, he provided us with important
actionable intelligence.
We discovered, for example, that
Khalid Shaikh Mohammed was the mastermind of the 9/11 attacks. Abu
Zubaydah also told us about Jose Padilla, the so-called dirty bomber.
This experience fit what I had found throughout my counterterrorism
career: traditional interrogation techniques are successful in
identifying operatives, uncovering plots and saving lives.
There was no actionable intelligence gained from using enhanced
interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah that wasn’t, or couldn’t have
been, gained from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using these
alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on more than a few
occasions — all of which are still classified. The short sightedness
behind the use of these techniques ignored the unreliability of the
methods, the nature of the threat, the mentality and modus operandi of
the terrorists, and due process.
Defenders of these techniques
have claimed that they got Abu Zubaydah to give up information leading
to the capture of Ramzi bin al-Shibh, a top aide to Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed, and Mr. Padilla. This is false. The information that led to
Mr. Shibh’s capture came primarily from a different terrorist operative
who was interviewed using traditional methods. As for Mr. Padilla, the
dates just don’t add up: the harsh techniques were approved in the memo
of August 2002, Mr. Padilla had been arrested that May.
One of
the worst consequences of the use of these harsh techniques was that it
reintroduced the so-called Chinese wall between the C.I.A. and F.B.I.,
similar to the communications obstacles that prevented us from working
together to stop the 9/11 attacks. Because the bureau would not employ
these problematic techniques, our agents who knew the most about the
terrorists could have no part in the investigation. An F.B.I. colleague
of mine who knew more about Khalid Shaikh Mohammed than anyone in the
government was not allowed to speak to him.
It was the right
decision to release these memos, as we need the truth to come out. This
should not be a partisan matter, because it is in our national security
interest to regain our position as the world’s foremost defenders of
human rights. Just as important, releasing these memos enables us to
begin the tricky process of finally bringing these terrorists to
justice.
The debate after the release of these memos has centered
on whether C.I.A. officials should be prosecuted for their role in
harsh interrogation techniques. That would be a mistake. Almost all the
agency officials I worked with on these issues were good people who
felt as I did about the use of enhanced techniques: it is un-American,
ineffective and harmful to our national security.
Fortunately
for me, after I objected to the enhanced techniques, the message came
through from Pat D’Amuro, an F.B.I. assistant director, that “we don’t
do that,” and I was pulled out of the interrogations by the F.B.I.
director, Robert Mueller (this was documented in the report released last year by the Justice Department’s inspector general).
My C.I.A. colleagues
who balked at the techniques, on the other hand, were instructed to
continue. (It’s worth noting that when reading between the lines of the
newly released memos, it seems clear that it was contractors, not
C.I.A. officers, who requested the use of these techniques.)
As
we move forward, it’s important to not allow the torture issue to harm
the reputation, and thus the effectiveness, of the C.I.A. The agency is
essential to our national security. We must ensure that the mistakes
behind the use of these techniques are never repeated. We’re making a
good start: President Obama has limited interrogation techniques to the
guidelines set in the Army Field Manual, and Leon Panetta, the C.I.A.
director, says he has banned the use of contractors and secret overseas
prisons for terrorism suspects (the so-called black sites). Just as
important, we need to ensure that no new mistakes are made in the
process of moving forward — a real danger right now.
Ali Soufan was an F.B.I. supervisory special agent from 1997 to 2005.
---
So, ignoring that it's just plain torture and wrong, seems they weren't all that effective. Can we all just agree it was very wrong and to never stoop to that low of a level of human rights again, please? I don't understand how anyone can actually think this was in any way OK or try to justify it.
Like this chump...
